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THE LEGAL LOGIC OF WARS OF CONQUEST:
TRUCES AND BETRAYAL IN THE EARLY
MODERN WORLD
LAUREN BENTON ∗
By definition, the term “conquest” implies the dominance of one
political community over others. By definition, too, “conquest” denotes war,
and histories of conquest tend to feature episodes of extraordinary brutality,
including the complete destruction of civilian settlements. This basic
understanding of conquest as political dominance through warfare brings
unity to narratives about historical settings as diverse as Inner Asia under
Mongol assault, Muslim and Christian advances across the Iberian
Peninsula, and the Spanish takeover of indigenous South America. The
history of the early modern world has sometimes been styled as a history of
invasion, occupation, and the sweeping cultural and institutional
consequences of both.
These basic assumptions about the nature of conquest deserve closer
scrutiny. Rather than the stark opposition of conquering and conquered
societies or the clear-cut dominance of victors over vanquished, early
modern campaigns of conquest depended on, and also gave rise to, pluripolitical formations. Conquering and conquered societies boasted multiple
corporate entities and jumbles of overlapping jurisdictions, and these plural
structures guided the strategies and determined the pace and designs of
conquest. Campaigns of conquest also produced new patterns of association
in fragmented political fields, from experiments in confederation to the
construction of fragile networks of alliances. The overwhelming power of
conquerors and the catastrophic defeat of the conquered could coexist with
the persistence of indigenous polities’ autonomy and often produced
powerful constraints on the actions of imperial rulers.
A closer look at conquest reveals, too, that peace pacts formed an
integral part of the process. Whether labeled as imperial projects or not,
conquests enlarged composite polities, and truces created allies and
established tributary arrangements such that zones of relative, if unstable,
calm sat adjacent to frontiers of open warfare. Parties to truces recognized
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them as vulnerable to disturbance, yet the benefits of peace made such
arrangements irresistible, no matter their duration. Many subordinate polities
insisted on describing their relation to invaders as one of alliance even after
submitting and becoming tribute payers, and imperial agents often adopted
the posture of allies when forcefully entering foreign political territories.
Some invaders acted initially as tribute payers of host polities before finding
advantage and assuming the mantle of conquerors. The alternation of fragile
peace and strident conflict created by the context of truces dictated the pace
of conquest. Shifting alliances continually reconfigured frontier regions and
generated small conflicts that could intensify and spread rapidly. Regardless
of the balance of power reflected in truces, all sides understood their
volatility and knew that the chronic violence of raiding during periods of
peace could move political relationships very quickly from mutual protection
to enmity, or from peaceful inequality to open conflict and domination. 1
In both tributary states and zones of open warfare, intermittent violence
drove the dynamics of warfare. Pitched battles were very meaningful but also
rare, and “small wars” (some declared, some not) produced more bloodshed
if we sum the results of raiding, counter-raiding, violence against women,
and captive-taking. This is not to say that conquest campaigns lacked
decisive battles. The sack of Constantinople, the fall of Granada, the taking
of Tenochtitlan—these and other famous engagements served as the
centerpieces of conquest chronicles for good reason; they carried great
symbolic importance and conferred strategic advantage on the victors.
Contemporaries’ emphasis on these engagements reflected, too, widely held
views that outcomes of pitched battles expressed divine will. Staged battles
represented extensions of legal modes of conflict resolution and could even
formally substitute for judicial proceedings in deciding conflicts.2 Yet
seemingly decisive battles took their meaning, too, from the quiet warfare
that regularly punctuated long phases of supposed peace.
Recognizing the pluralism of early modern political entities before and
after conquest, studying the violence of peacetime, and tracing the instability
of alliances – these approaches bring into view important and often
overlooked elements of the legal logic of conquest. In a broad sense, the
1. The subject of truces is related to but slightly different from the subject of peace treaties, which
has been examined somewhat more systematically as sources of international law. See generally PEACE
TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: FROM THE LATE MIDDLE AGES TO WORLD
WAR ONE (Randall Lesaffer ed., 2004); EMPIRE BY TREATY: NEGOTIATING EUROPEAN EXPANSION,
1600–1900 (Saliha Belmessous ed., 2014).
2. JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE VERDICT OF BATTLE: THE LAW OF VICTORY AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN WAR 8, 46–47 (2012); FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 297
(Walter Ullmann ed., 1975).
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practices produced a vernacular jurisprudence of conquest that emerged
through the acts and pronouncements of those involved in conflict. More
specifically, the politics of truces and the rationales for “small wars” created
a close association between the violence of conquest and narratives of
betrayal. Contemporary chronicles routinely describe massacres, destructive
raids, and sudden outbursts of violence against civilian populations as
retribution for broken promises of peace and trust, some formal and some
assumed. The emphasis on trust and betrayal often led potential antagonists
to place a high value on striking first and also amplified descriptions of what
constituted self-defense. The pluri-political contexts of conquest and
associated anxieties about alliances and betrayal had the further effect of
focusing the discourse of conquest on goals of protection and peacemaking.
In many ways, such justifications for violence fit neatly within the
European just war tradition. Medieval formulations posited that a just war
could be conducted in response to injury, and injuries could include harms
ranging from unlawful taking of property to endangerment of broadly
interpreted standards of human justice. 3 Late medieval and early modern
innovators offered variations of what constituted injury and who might exact
punishment. 4 They characterized various types of offensive behavior as
violations of natural law or, more nebulously, as challenges to the legal order
of “the whole world which is in a sense a commonwealth.” 5 Yet agreement
about the legal foundations for violence against polities and people far from
Europe remained elusive. Although the basic elements of what made war just
were strikingly consistent across periods and authors, there was also no clear
consensus about what constituted injury, who had the authority to sanction
violence or declare war, what conduct was required of soldiers in a just war,
and the degree to which a just war needed to have an ameliorative effect,
such as serving the good of all by establishing a basis for long-lasting peace.6

3. See, e.g., RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 65 (writing about Gratian).
4. For Vitoria, American Indians’ violation of the natural right to trade and travel could authorize
violence; for Grotius, private parties could legitimately act to punish violations of natural law. Anthony
Pagden, Conquest and the Just War: The “School of Salamanca” and the “Affair of the Indies”, in
EMPIRE AND MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 30,47 (Sankar Muthu ed., 2012) (discussing Vitoria);
Richard Tuck, Introduction to HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE VOL. 3 ix, xvii-xviii
(Richard Tuck ed., Liberty Fund 2005) (1625); Benjamin Straumann, The Right to Punish as a Just Cause
of War in Hugo Grotius’ Natural Law, 2 STUD. IN THE HIST. OF ETHICS 1, 1 (2006).
5. See Pagden, supra note 4, at 43 (quoting Vitoria). Pagden points out that Vitoria appeared to
cast the ius gentium as something broader than the Roman law governing Rome’s relations with nonRoman peoples and represent it as a secondary natural law that applied to all men and was recognized by
all polities.
6. See Jonathan Barnes, The Just War, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATER MEDIEVAL
PHILOSOPHY: FROM THE REDISCOVERY OF ARISTOTLE TO THE DISINTEGRATION OF SCHOLASTICISM,
1100–1600 771, 771–84 (Norman Kretzmann & Anthony Kenny Jan Pinborg, eds. 1982).
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Opinion shifted, too, on whether it was licit to form alliances across religious
boundaries, particularly for the purpose of fighting co-religionists. 7
Such variations and shifts make it difficult to evaluate European
colonial practice against evolving patterns of political thought about just war.
By the same token, it is challenging to divine the relation between European
and non-European legal approaches to violence. 8 Fortunately, such
approaches are not the only options. One can recognize the mutually
constitutive relation between theological discourse about just war and the
quotidian narration of acts of war without making that relationship a singular
object of study. And one can incorporate history beyond Europe without
turning the exercise into the study of non-European influences on European
writings on international law or into part of a story about European
universalism. 9 Analysis of participants’ actions and justifications for war
brings to light repeating elements of discourse about law and war, making it
possible to consider directly and more fully the juridical framing for
violence. Whatever the ties to evolving theories of just war, there can be no
doubt that conventions of warfare in conquest informed rationales for both
routine raiding and exceptional violence. In turn, quotidian references to
violence shaped the conduct of conquest.
This paper illustrates the value of this approach by sketching some
common scenarios of conquest and war against the backdrop of truces and
alliances in pluri-political landscapes. Violence in composite political fields
tended to highlight themes of betrayal in justifications for violence. Betrayal
was a charge applied with special frequency to unsteady allies and to vassals
who were understood as having pledged allegiance in some form to new
sovereigns. Accusations of betrayal could frame claims of ongoing or
sporadic injury that justified raiding, and they could serve as a convenient
trigger for exceptionally brutal attacks on former allies or friends-turnedenemies. In structural terms, the theme of betrayal signaled the delicate
situation of polities positioned as simultaneously inside and outside pre- and
post-conquest political orders. 10
7. Richard Tuck, Alliances with Infidels in the European Imperial Expansion, in EMPIRE AND
MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 61, 61–83 (Sankar Muthu ed., 2012).
8. The search for influence of Asian interpolity norms and practice, including laws of war, on
European writings about the law of nations makes up one strand—largely repudiated by subsequent
writers—of the work of C.H. Alexandrowicz. See David Armitage & Jennifer Pitts, This Modern Grotius:
An Introduction to the Life and Thought of C.H. Alexandrowicz, in THE LAW OF NATIONS IN GLOBAL
HISTORY 1, 28 (David Armitage & Jennifer Pitts, eds. 2017).
9. For examples of such alternative approaches, see LAURA BENTON & LISA FORD, RAGE FOR
ORDER: THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1800–1850 1–27 (2016);
JENNIFER PITTS, BOUNDARIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW: LAW AND EMPIRE (2018).
10. The “inside/outside” problem of international relations is addressed in various scholarship. See,
e.g., R.B.J. WALKER, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS POLITICAL THEORY 1–25, 169–
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The article begins with some general observations about the role of
political pluralism and routines of war and peace in campaigns of conquest
across the Eurasian world. I then analyze these currents in several wellknown episodes of Spanish conquest in the Americas, highlighting
continuities in practice that reinforced narratives about truces and betrayal.
Finally, I briefly consider some broader implications of the perspective
developed here for an understanding of interpolity law in the early modern
world.
CONQUEST AS A GLOBAL PHENOMENON
The association of conquest with phases of warfare followed by
political consolidation arises in part from traditional accounts of the Roman
Empire. Historians describe a long phase of warfare, including many
examples of Romans’ brutalization of defeated populations, that produced
imperial expansion on a vast scale. This phase gave rise to the Pax Romana,
defined as several centuries of relative peace in the territories controlled by
Rome, and a sharpening difference between areas legally incorporated inside
the Roman sphere and regions beyond it defined as the land of barbarians.
That consolidating phase was followed by the split of the empire into eastern
and western parts and then, of course, by the conquest of Rome itself.
Recent scholarship calls our attention to two subtle but important
elements of this history that begin to reshape our understanding of Roman
violence. First, a culture and practice of raiding were central both to Rome’s
expansion and to the Pax Romana. Small-scale military actions and the lure
of plunder fit within broader patterns of conflict and interpolity relations, and
in this sense Roman aggression against neighboring polities was singular in
its success over a long period but not unusual in its modalities. 11 During the
Pax Romana, the majority of Roman fighting forces were stationed in
garrisons along the frontier, where they responded to and also engaged in
raiding. 12 Routines of raiding were widely recognized and repeated, and so
were the options and strategies they generated. No line of garrisons could
protect perfectly against incursions, and raids for plunder continually tested
the ability of settled regions to defend themselves against predation. Raiders
did not move aimlessly about but homed in on targets on or near the frontier

174 (Steve Smith et al., 1993); ANNABEL S. BRETT, CHANGES OF STATE: NATURE AND THE LIMITS OF
THE CITY IN EARLY MODERN NATURAL LAW 10–17 (2011); BENTON & FORD, supra note 9, at 193–94.
11. See generally ARTHUR M. ECKSTEIN, MEDITERRANEAN ANARCHY, INTERSTATE WAR, AND
THE RISE OF ROME (2009).
12. ADRIAN GOLDSWORTHY, PAX ROMANA: WAR, PEACE AND CONQUEST IN THE ROMAN WORLD
381 (2016) (“The bulk of the Roman army was deployed in frontier areas—or in mountainous or other
difficult country inside the provinces.”).
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that were weak and rich – the ideal combination – about which they already
possessed some information.
Raiding was associated with a set of rationales for violence, a repertoire
rather than a rule book for forces on both sides. The value of alliances lay
both in their ability to generate information about potential enemies and in
the possibilities they created for broader-scale warfare when alliances broke
down. Raiding parties in some cases hoped for organized opposition that
would justify a brutal response, while those defending against raids often
maneuvered to intercept raiders on their way back to their home territories
burdened by their booty. A period of successful raiding in a territory could
lead to more organized assaults and the establishment of permanent
footholds from which to launch further raids. In this sense, as one scholar
points out, in the ancient world within and beyond Rome there was “no
simple divide between full-scale war and minor raiding and skirmishing, for
one led naturally to the other.” 13
The transition from raiding to open war was not always clearly marked,
but Roman rituals did exist to create a legal framework for war. Fetial ritual,
or the symbolic actions of a college of priests, could legitimize and formalize
a state of war. The ritual took the form of a warning of aggression, and
generally followed a period of attempts to seek redress for harm, offering
populations about to be under attack the opportunity of surrender, usually in
exchange for protection against violence to lives and property. Clifford Ando
points to one of the clearest contemporary descriptions of this ritual:
When they wanted to declare war, the pater patratus, that is, the chief of
the fetials, would set out for the enemy’s border. There he would speak
certain solemn pronouncements, saying either in a clear voice that the
Romans were declaring war for specific reasons, either because they had
harmed allies of Rome, or because they had not returned animals they had
stolen or captives they had seized. This is called the clarigatio, from the
claritas of his voice. After the clarigatio, a spear is hurled into the enemy’s
territory, to indicate the commencement of hostilities. 14

The ritual achieved a legal reset by announcing the grievances behind
previous violence or diplomacy and by shifting the burden of causing the
outbreak of war to the enemy. As Ando notes, the intention was not “to
forestall violence” but to “inaugurate wars.” 15

13. Id. at 54–56, 382 .
14. CLIFFORD ANDO, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND EMPIRE IN THE ROMAN TRADITION 52 (2011). The
same source sets out that where hostile territories were hard to reach, the ritual could be conducted by
instructing a prisoner of war from the hostile territory to purchase a piece of land in Roman-controlled
territory and then throwing a spear into it. Ando argues that the ritual in this case creates abstract and
general categories detached from enemies’ actions.
15. Id. at 51.
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Practices of raiding and rituals of warfare paralleled persistent legal
pluralism and helped to blur the distinction between territories inside the
empire and those outside that might become incorporated. 16 Against the
standard account of a sharp division between the ius civile and the ius
gentium, there is evidence that Romans relied on analogy to extend the legal
status of citizen to aliens while continuing to recognize elements of legal
difference between them. It has not been easy to appreciate the subtlety and
complexity of Roman legal strategies because of the “suspiciously
homogeneous” nature of the Justinian Corpus and a dearth of information
about the legal treatment of aliens. Yet we understand the legal pluralism of
the empire to be one of its defining characteristics, with the elaboration of
the category of “Latin” as distinct from “citizen” and a series of other
conceits amounting to “the endless construal of aliens as citizens.” 17
Placing Roman practices of war and peace in the context of much more
broadly recognized and widely copied conventions does not equate to a
straightforward argument about the Roman origins of a legal framework for
conquest. Instead, it allows us to recognize patterns of war and rationales for
conquest that influenced a flexible vernacular and helped denizens of the
Mediterranean world make sense of widely occurring political and military
practices. Interpolity raiding, surrender, and extreme violence encompassed
and paralleled Roman approaches.
To bring this observation into focus, consider the practices of violence
framing the Arab conquests between the seventh and eleventh centuries. An
older view of the Arab conquests pointed to the importance of pressures
impelling Arab migration. Critical perspectives on the root causes of the
conquests largely left in place a persistent emphasis on their scope and speed.
Moving out from the Arabian Peninsula, we are told, Islamic-inspired
fighters cut a wide swath of invasion and destruction across the Middle East,
North Africa, and Iberia that spread Islam throughout the region. 18
Recent studies reveal the conquests to be less “Islamic” in character and
even less “Arab” than historians initially thought, and show the conquests as
relying on and in many regions engendering persistent political pluralism.
16.
17.
18.

See supra note 10.
ANDO, supra note 14, at 17–18.
A valuable overview of earlier narratives of the Arab conquests, including the migration thesis,
is FRED DONNER, THE EARLY ISLAMIC CONQUESTS 3–10 (1981). The characterization of the conquests
as an expansionist project envisioned and led by Middle Eastern Arabs finds repetition in popular
histories. Hugh Kennedy, for example, describes his popular account as “a tale of how a small number . . .
of determined and highly motivated men were able to cover vast distances, through rugged and
inhospitable lands, to conquer major empires and kingdoms and to rule their lands” and describes the
speed of these events as “amazing.” HUGH KENNEDY, THE GREAT ARAB CONQUESTS: HOW THE SPREAD
OF ISLAM CHANGED THE WORLD WE LIVE IN 1, 3 (2008).

BENTON FOR PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE)

432

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

8/29/2018 10:41 AM

[Vol 28:425

The conquests were also not “imperial” in the usual sense, nor impelled by a
singular group of interconnected bands and their descendants. Arabs joined
an array of other peoples responding to opportunities for raiding created by
a long “cold war standoff” of Byzantium and the Persian Empire and by a
weakening of Byzantine, Persian, and Chinese power in the sixth century.
Viewed in this light, the Arabs appear as the “most successful of the
peripheral peoples” on the edges of imperial spheres of influence or
inhabiting zones of inter-imperial tension. 19
Arabs’ seventh-century advances displayed familiar features of ancient
Eurasian and Roman raiding. Muhammed’s coalition made peace
agreements with a series of towns in Byzantine Arabia, Palestine, and Syria,
concluding truces with local rulers rather than their imperial overlords.
Raiding intended for procuring booty could lead in irregular fashion to actual
conquest, and raiders sometimes avoided fortified settlements at first and,
pressed for provisions like other raiding armies, aimed at easier, more
quickly dominated settlements of lesser symbolic significance. When
approaching larger targets, raiders frequently demanded submission and
tribute in exchange for a promise of securing lives and property. For their
part, isolated and weak settlements anticipating an invasion could strike for
peace by requesting such terms. The pressures to submit in the face of the
threat of Arab raiders helped to fray imperial connections, as town rulers
negotiated capitulations independently of Byzantine overlords. 20
Those towns suing for peace or agreeing to Arab demands to submit did
not consider themselves necessarily defeated or conquered. They sought to
maintain some autonomy and often negotiated for a greater measure of it if
they could offer military assistance to raiders. They were aware that
submission, while life saving, also preserved the possibility of a power
reversal at a later date. Sometimes, too, raiders took their tribute or booty,
and then left. Capitulating after a long phase of resistance could result in
more severe treatment by raiders, even if a pact was signed to preserve lives
and property. After the Cypriot city of Lapathos surrendered in 650
following resistance and a siege, for example, the result was not just a
thorough sacking of the city’s goods and treasures but also mass enslavement
and shipments of probably tens of thousands of captives to Syria. 21
If demands for submission and the tactics and timing of capitulation
were strategically varied rather than formulaic, negotiations also relied on
widespread familiarity with the politics and legalities of raiding. Similar
19. ROBERT G. HOYLAND, IN GOD’S PATH: THE ARAB CONQUESTS AND THE CREATION OF AN
ISLAMIC EMPIRE 21 (2015).
20. See id. at 39, 44, 47, 67.
21. Id. at 93.
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practices of submission and payment of tribute in exchange for the promise
of protection permeated the Eurasian and African worlds into which Arab
forces were advancing. Formal agreements of this type included the
Roman/Byzantine model of the deditio in fidem, which involved surrender
in connection with a pledge by the invader to act in good faith in
implementing the conditions with a measure of justice and mercy. 22 The
arrangement was formalized in a treaty or pact.
This framework for violence and its suspension preserved and
generated pluralism in various ways. The pluralism of the raiding parties
characterized the Arab conquests from the earliest stages, as armies relied on
religiously and ethnically different fighting forces and as the dispersed
geography of campaigns made imperial centralization impossible. The
process of conquest itself also produced political pluralism. Treaty making
with individual settlements shifted polities from one imperial sphere to
another without removing political differences that set up the dynamics of
later conflict or rebellion. For example, the revolt of Berber groups split an
emerging Arab sphere of influence and gave rise to new Berber composite
polities. Political fragmentation also took place alongside shifting pluralist
frameworks inside incorporated territories, where distinctions of status and
religious difference were embedded in structures of taxation and rule.
The Iberian Reconquest from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries
represented a variant within this vast regional complex of raiding, tribute,
and composite political formations. Although the Reconquest undoubtedly
belongs to the history of crusading Christendom, to regard it mainly as a
religious campaign is to overlook the medium of fractured polities through
which the struggle developed. The frontier was never defined simply by
religious opposition. At times both Christian and Muslim rulers reached
across religious lines to form alliances, and at times they attacked coreligionists or hired mercenaries without regard to religion. Some periods of
intensifying religious zeal on both sides corresponded to phases of
heightened violence and in-fighting among co-religionists.
Especially striking is the degree to which the Reconquest moved
through two familiar and persistent practices: raiding and truces enabling the
collection of tribute. As occurred elsewhere in the early modern world, some
pitched battles took place, and some took on special symbolism in shifting
overall military advantage. Yet most fighters avoided pitched battles and the
risks they entailed, and they even maneuvered to delay siege warfare until
raiding had pushed the enemy back to defensive positions and secured the

22. Gerhard Wirth, Rome and its Germanic Partners in the Fourth Century, in KINGDOMS OF THE
EMPIRE: THE INTEGRATION OF BARBARIANS IN LATE ANTIQUITY 13, 20-21 (Walter Pohl ed., 1997).
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surrounding countryside. Even then, sieges were difficult to sustain and
raiding armies returned to the cover of territories secured, more or less,
behind lines of fortified towns and castles. Between the ninth and fifteenth
centuries, the fluid frontier was not a battle line but a hazard zone where the
only settlements were small and insecure sites exposed to predation by
raiders.
Raiding drew willing participants not just for the glory of serving in
what was regarded and rewarded as a rightful (and godly) cause. Raids
produced booty in the form of treasure, captives, and – of growing
importance in Iberia – livestock. 23 Minor notables as well as commoners on
the frontier responded readily to the lure of such rewards, and royal sponsors
of raids profited through collection of one-fifth of the value of the booty.
More generally, sustained campaigns of destructive raiding produced
windfalls in the form of tribute. A first phase of rampant tribute taking by
Muslims began in the mid-tenth century, when caliphate armies under alHakam wreaked havoc to the north. Sancho II of Navarre, Ramiro II of Leon,
and several counts who were formally dependent polities within a loosely
structured Leonese empire all sent peace embassies to al-Hakam and agreed
to pay tribute. Under al-Hakam’s successor, al-Mansur, Christian polities
continued to recognize the superior strength of the caliphate, which in turn
did not press to conquer them in part because tribute made uneasy truces so
profitable. In the early eleventh century, continual civil war within the
caliphate – there were 15 changes in rule between 1009 and 1027 – splintered
Muslim political power. The multiple successor states to the caliphate, the
taifa kingdoms, found themselves exposed to raiding and forced to pay
tribute themselves. A resurgent Navarre under Fernando I in the middle of
the eleventh century even maneuvered to extract tribute from taifa kingdoms
in exchange for protection from attacks by Christian neighbors in Castile and
Aragon. 24
If tribute in exchange for protection from harm represented a key
modality of conflict and conquest, reversals of fortunes could radically shift

23. Livestock raids could produce significant windfalls. Forces from Cordoba in 1191 conducted
an attack on Christian-held Silva and took 3,000 prisoners and 15,000 head of cattle. JAMES BRODMAN,
RANSOMING CAPTIVES IN CRUSADER SPAIN: THE ORDER OF THE MERCED ON THE CHRISTIAN-ISLAMIC
FRONTIER 3 (1986). On the cultural significance of livestock raiding, see JAVIER IRIGOYEN-GARCIA, THE
SPANISH ARCADIA: SHEEP HERDING, PASTORAL DISCOURSE, AND ETHNICITY IN EARLY MODERN SPAIN
86–87 (2014).
24. DEREK LOMAX, THE RECONQUEST OF SPAIN 47–50 (1978); R.A. Fletcher, Reconquest and
Crusade in Spain c. 1050–1150, in SPAIN, PORTUGAL AND THE ATLANTIC FRONTIER OF MEDIEVAL
EUROPE 69, 73( José-Juan López-Portillo ed., 2013).
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tributary arrangements. 25 After the Almoravids swept over the taifas in the
twelfth century, they no longer had to pay tribute to Christians. But tributary
arrangements returned in the early thirteenth century as Muslim kings of
Valencia and Baeza declared themselves vassals of Fernando III and when
the caliph of Seville, Abu-l-’Ula, pledged to pay tribute to Fernando III in
exchange for a truce.
The long, last phase of conflict leading up to the conquest of Granada
centered on the recognized subordination of the last great Muslim polity on
the peninsula and its tribute payments to Christian rulers. The treaty signed
by Muhammad I of Granada and Fernando III in 1246 set the pattern for a
series of subsequent truces over nearly two and a half centuries. In the
agreement, Muhammad I declared himself to be Fernando III’s vassal and
agreed to pay the Catholic king annual tribute. Fernando III in turn
recognized Muhammed’s authority within the emirate of Granada and other
territories. Like subsequent truces, the pact had a time limit specified, in this
case twenty years. 26 This pact was followed by no fewer than 74 other truces
signed between Catholic monarchs and rulers in Granada between 1246 and
1492. Truces did not end warfare in the form of raiding along the fluid
frontier. Surprise attacks and destructive forays of short duration by frontier
forces generally did not signify breaking the peace. There was not a single
year between 1464 and 1481 without at least one raid and counter-raid,
including major attacks on Christian-held Villacarrillo and Cieza in 1477,
despite the truce signed in 1475. 27
The counterpart of the truce was capitulation. As in Arab and Mongol
conquests, the Christian advance was accompanied by demands for
settlements to surrender and meet certain demands. In Portugal and Spain,
Muslims were typically sent into exile and instructed to leave all their
property behind. Christian armies presented exile as a concession, the
alternative to destructive pillaging. Fernando III allowed the Muslims of
Capilla, Baeza, Ubeda, Cordoba, Jaen, and Sevilla to leave and assured their
safety, and even their possession of some property, as they traveled to
Muslim territories. 28 But Christian raiders did not always accept payments
in lieu of attack, and following a practice familiar across the Eurasian world
25. On the sale and purchase of protection more generally, see Lauren Benton & Adam Clulow,
Empires and Protection: Making Interpolity Law in the Early Modern World, 12 J. OF GLOBAL HIST., 74,
75 (2017).
26. DOLORES MARÍA PÉREZ CASTAÑERA, ENEMIGOS SECULARS: GUERRA Y TREGUAS ENTRE
CASTILLA Y GRANADA (C. 1246—C. 1481) 22 (2013).
27. MIGUEL ANGEL LADERO QUESADA, LA GUERRA DE GRANADA (1482–1491) 16 (2001).
28. JOSEPH F. O’CALLAGHAN, RECONQUEST AND CRUSADE IN MEDIEVAL SPAIN 140 (2003). On
the capitulation agreements leading up the conquest of Granada, see MIGUEL ANGEL LADERO QUESADA,
CASTILLA Y LA CONQUISTA DEL REINO DE GRANADA 79–97 (1988).
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they sometimes brutally punished townsmen who surrendered after a long
siege or who refused to submit. 29
Raiding, alliance formation, capitulation and tribute extraction – these
routines structured all phases of the Reconquest. The persistent political
pluralism of the peninsula made the combination possible and necessary. In
the last stages of the long campaign against Granada, when the Catholic
kings Isabela and Fernando had determined to take the city, these same
modalities were present, while new patterns also emerged. Alongside typical
acts of capitulation, sponsored settlement, and the grant of fueros, or law
codes, the crown took on a stronger role, insisting on making all
ecclesiastical appointments and extending a measure of royal jurisdiction
throughout the new territories. This enhanced royal power existed alongside
the resurgent power of nobles who were receiving rich grants in lands and
offices through the conquest. Also in contrast to the conquests of Seville and
Cordoba, most Muslim residents of the city stayed in place and retained some
property rights. 30 Recent studies properly insist that when gauging the
influence of the Reconquest on the Spanish conquest of the Americas, we
should specify that conflicts before and after the conquest of Granada,
together with Iberian experiences in North Africa and the Atlantic islands,
represented the most immediate reference points for the Spanish crown and
its agents. 31
Religious crusading and a penchant for regarding violence against nonChristians as legitimate enemies are therefore only part of the story. By the
same token, to herald convivencia as Iberia’s lost tradition of tolerance is to
romanticize this period of conflict. Routines of raiding, truce signing, tribute
extraction, negotiated submission, and post-conquest jurisdictional conflict
played an outsize role in structuring participation in conquest and
distributing its rewards, as well as in shaping justifications for violence.
Some distinctive Iberian variants of these practices emerged, but in general
they resembled raiding and truce making familiar throughout the Eurasian

29. For example, as at Almeria, where mass enslavement followed the siege. See O’CALLAGHAN,
supra note 28, at 140.
30. The strength of crown authority should not be exaggerated; crown policy was reactive and
largely driven by petitions from various groups of local notables. See DAVID COLEMAN, CREATING
CHRISTIAN GRANADA: SOCIETY AND RELIGIOUS CULTURE IN AN OLD-WORLD FRONTIER CITY, 1492–
1600 74 (2003).
31. The Atlantic islands as a model for colonization in the Americas is long recognized, but recent
studies have pushed to deepen the understanding of continuities. See, e.g., Gabriel Rocha, Empire from
the Commons: Making Colonial Archipelagos in the Early Iberian Atlantic (2016) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, New York University).
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world. 32 This complex of conquest practices shaped Atlantic violence and
the political and legal frameworks of overseas European empires.
CONQUISTADORS AND VIOLENCE
It may be helpful to begin discussion of conquest by Spaniards in the
New World with a single example. In 1512, the Spanish crown issued a
contract to Juan Ponce de Leon, then resident in Havana, granting him the
right to “discover and settle” the Island of Bimini, an undefined area that
encompassed what we now call Florida, and appointing him adelantado, a
term lifted from the Reconquest to signify an officer in charge of the Spanish
advance with responsibility for civil and criminal jurisdiction over the
expedition and over any lands he might discover and settle. 33 Like other
similar grants issued to Spanish agents in the Americas, the contract focused
on the financial framework for the venture, mainly Ponce’s commitment to
finance expeditions and settlements to the region, together with his
obligation to provide the crown with a share of “the gold and other metals
and things of value that might be on the stated island.” There was no explicit
authorization of war against the inhabitants—only indirect references to
sanctioned violence in the mention of repartimiento of the Indians (their
assignment as labor), specifications about the financing of fortresses “for
defense against the Indians,” and reference to Ponce’s entitlement to exercise
“full power” in the territory. 34
Only two years later, the Spanish crown issued an addendum. Written
after the passage of the 1512 Laws of Burgos placing constraints on the

32. Pluralism was a feature of these broader European patterns, too. Colonialism within Europe
centered on what one scholar has called “a process of replication” involving the creation of new
settlements modeled on the legal, civic, and ecclesiastic institutions of late medieval towns in settled
areas. Corporate entities organized these replicated places, and even as royal power grew stronger in
sponsorship of conquest and settlement, the most powerful parties guiding new town politics consisted
of consortia of merchants, townsmen, and clerics, together with noble and royal sponsors. Such patterns
were integral to an expansionary phase that resulted in the doubling in size of Latin Christendom between
950 and 1250. See ROBERT BARTLETT, THE MAKING OF EUROPE: CONQUEST, COLONIZATION AND
CULTURAL CHANGE, 950–1350 307–08 (1993).
33. On the legal capacities and responsibilities of adelantados in Castile, see ROBERT
MACDONALD, LEYES DE LOS ADELANTADOS MAYORS: REGULATIONS, ATTRIBUTED TO ALFONSO X OF
CASTILE, CONCERNING THE KING’S VICAR IN THE JUDICIARY AND IN TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION 5–
29 (Robert A. MacDonald ed., 2000). And on the legal meaning and context of claims of discovery and
settlement, see Lauren Benton & Benjamin Straumann, Acquiring Empire by Law: From Roman Doctrine
to Early Modern European Practice, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 1–38 (2010); LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH
FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 1400–1900 22–23 (2010); SANTIAGO
OLMEDO BERNAL, EL DOMINIO DEL ATLÁNTICO EN LA BAJA EDAD MEDIA: LOS TÍTULOS JURÍDICOS DE
LA EXPANSION PENINSULAR HASTA EL TRATADO DE TORDESILLAS 420–22 (1995).
34. JOHN E. WORTH, DISCOVERING FLORIDA: FIRST CONTACT NARRATIVES FROM SPANISH
EXPEDITIONS ALONG THE LOWER GULF COAST 73–74 (John E. Worth ed. and trans, 2014).
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enslavement of Indians in the New World, the second contract outlined the
conditions under which Ponce might conduct an authorized war against
Indians. Ponce was instructed in dealing with the Indian inhabitants to “make
them understand” that they were required to embrace the Catholic faith and
“obey and serve” representatives of the Spanish crown. The crown
authorized war against Indians if they chose not to obey or if they agreed and
then later rebelled. Ponce was provided with the requerimiento, a statement
drafted by Juan López de Palacios Rubios, a jurist on the Council of Castile,
and approved by the crown in 1513, outlining Indians’ obligation to submit
and the right to attack, imprison, and enslave them if they did not. 35
These instructions to Ponce, and many others like them, have helped to
frame some lightly distorted assumptions about the Spanish conquest. The
documented destructiveness and violence of the conquest lead
understandably to the view that it was defined by a series of acts of
subjugation of Indians. 36 Yet Indian polities continued in military opposition
to the Spanish Empire and to independent nation-states of Latin America for
centuries. Some of these groups, like the Araucanians and the Charruas of
the southern cone, eluded decisive confrontations for a long time through a
combination of warfare and semi-nomadic migration. Yet these were not the
only political communities that persisted. In Mesoamerica, numerous micropolities contributed to the Spanish invasion and expected in return to receive
a measure of autonomy and exemptions from tribute. 37 In Peru, the
symbolically momentous murder of the Incan ruler and his followers at
Cajamarca marked not the end of conquest but the beginning of a long phase
of civil war on the side of the Spaniards and the establishment of a second
Incan state at Vilcabamba. 38 And in New Spain, the post-conquest landscape
remained one of multiple micro-polities whose leaders simultaneously acted
as Spanish imperial officials and directed the independent political life of
Indian “republics.” 39

35. Id. at 80. For the text of the requerimiento, see Bartolomé de las Casas, HISTORIA DE LAS INDIAS
VOL. 3 3, 26–27 (Agustín Millares Carlo ed., 1951).
36. This approach underpins one of the persistent “myths” of the conquest: its “completion”
through effective subjugation. See MATTHEW RESTALL, SEVEN MYTHS OF THE SPANISH CONQUEST 64–
76 (2004).
37. Laura Matthews asserts that the Indians of Mesoamerica regarded their role as more than
“auxiliary” and regarded the invasion as a “joint affair.” LAURA MATTHEWS, MEMORIES OF CONQUEST:
BECOMING MEXICANO IN COLONIAL GUATEMALA 2 (2012).
38. See JOHN HEMMING, THE CONQUEST OF THE INCAS 305–19 (2003).
39. Bernardo Garcia Martinez, Hernán Cortés y la Invención de la Conquista de México, in
MIRADAS SOBRE HERNÁN CORTÉS 23, 23-47 (Maria del Carmen Martínez Martínez & Alicia Mayer, eds.,
(2016).
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The approach to conquest as a series of contests won by Spaniards also
misrepresents the mechanisms through which they were seeking advantage
and profit. As in the Reconquest, Spanish agents employed routines and
rituals of peace-making, including affirmations of the bonds of alliances and
negotiated truce agreements. 40 Declarations by Indians that they were vassals
of the king implied incorporation but not the dissolution of their political
communities; in fact, keeping these intact for the purposes of tribute exaction
was preferable. 41 At the same time, practices of “discovery and settlement”
referenced in Ponce’s contract were fundamental to solidifying Spanish
claims of possession and occupation in the Americas, and these focused less
on the submission of Indians and more on the symbolic rituals of founding
towns and their associated civic institutions, together with acts and
statements aimed at forestalling papal intervention against Castilian
claims. 42 Fluent in diplomacy and the rituals of warfare, Indians, meanwhile,
maneuvered to preserve the pluri-political structure of empire and to position
their political communities as semi-autonomous. In short, the practices of
conquest both required pluralism and called it into existence.
Not surprisingly given this context, Spanish chronicles,
correspondence, and contracts reporting the interactions with Indians
narrated raids and sometimes brutal violence against Indians as logical
responses to threats and as reactions to betrayal in the form of breaking the
terms of truces, alliances, and agreements to surrender. The ritual reading of
the requerimiento fit within this broader pattern, rather than the other way
around. In exploring the origins of the requerimiento, some historians have
pointed to the influence of Islamic jurisprudence in the Spanish court; echoes
of jihadi doctrine do appear to be present in the authorization of violence
against non-believers and apostates. 43 Others have located the foundations
of the requirimiento in medieval adaptations of Roman approaches to just
war, in particular the Roman emphasis on the need for formal authorization
of acts of violence other than those taken in self-defense, together with the
40. In doing so, they were not only acting on their experiences in Iberia and the Atlantic world but
also emulating Indian patterns, including the “establishment of alliances; the gathering of the
conquistador army; the creation of military garrison towns and ethnic organization of neighborhoods; the
arrival of non-military settlers; the awarding of land rights to military captains; and the expectation of
exemption from tribute and forced labor.” MATTHEWS, supra note 37, at 49.
41. The same could be said about Indian responses to British incursions in North America. On the
supple use of the language of subjecthood in the context of an Indian rebellion, see JENNY HALE
PULSIPHER, SUBJECTS UNTO THE SAME KING: INDIANS, ENGLISH, AND THE CONTEST FOR AUTHORITY IN
COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 81 (2005).
42. JAMES MULDOON, POPES, LAWYERS, AND INFIDELS: THE CHURCH AND THE NON-CHRISTIAN
WORLD 142 (1979).
43. PATRICIA SEED, CEREMONIES OF POSSESSION IN EUROPE’S CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD,
1492–1640 69–99 (1993).
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Roman view that enemies vanquished in a just war could be legally
dispossessed and enslaved. 44 Both origins stories can be read as connecting
the requerimiento to the broader practices we have surveyed of formal
demands for capitulation in exchange for limited protection and tribute
payments. Viewing the requerimiento and the rituals surrounding it as a
specific variant of this wider pattern allows us to understand the
inconsistencies of its application by Spaniards in the New World after 1513.
They did not need the specific form in order to be practicing the generally
recognized formula of raiding combined with demands for capitulation and
the proffer of protection. 45
The use of the requerimiento, as we see in Ponce’s case, came on the
scene after decades of Spanish-Indian interactions and authorizations of
violence like those of the first Ponce contract: indirect but also brutally
effective. The document’s presentation was also far from systematic. Critics
of Spanish treatment of Indians – most notably Bartolomé de las Casas, who
lamented that the requerimiento was often read “to the trees” – complained
that it was announced out of earshot of its intended audience and in a foreign
language. 46 But the unevenness of implementation went still further. Spanish
chronicles recount attacks on Indians with no reference at all to the reading
of the requerimiento.
This is not because Spanish imperial agents disapproved of the
document but because the ritual blended into a routine practice of demanding
declarations of vassalage. We see this in the description of Cortés’s advance
toward Tenochtitlan and his encounters with various Indian groups along the
way. In this telling, specifically crafted to appeal to the king, the advance
takes on the structure of an extended raid with the goal of subduing the
countryside surrounding his target of Tenochtitlan. Anthony Pagden has
suggested that Cortés’s actions were not yet styled as conquest because he
was asserting that Moctezuma was inviting him to Tenochtitlan and because
his “only acts of warfare” in his approach to the city had been “the
subjugation of Tlaxcala – which was in some sense an independent city –
and the massacre at Cholula.” 47 But Cortés was throughout his march relying
on the continual threat of violence and the occasional demonstration of
brutality, and these acts of “small” warfare were very significant. They were

44. RUSSELL, supra note 2, at 40–54.
45. The flexible use of the requerimiento is consistent with another of its purported aims: “to
demonstrate to the papacy that the Castilian invasion of the Americas was based on the refusal of the
natives to admit missionaries.” MULDOON, supra note 42, at 142.
46. LAS CASAS, supra note 35, at 28–31.
47. HERNÁN CORTÉS, LETTERS FROM MEXICO lxix (Anthony Pagden ed., 2001).
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also narrated as responses to the failure of Indians to make and observe
peace.
The requerimiento was read along the way, but not consistently. On the
island of Cozumel, off Yucatán, where Cortés knew of attacks on a previous
Spanish expedition, he found deserted towns and sent emissaries to find
chieftains. When one came forward, Cortés explained that his only demand
was “that the chieftains and people of the island should also owe obedience
to Your Highnesses; and [he] told them that by doing so they would be much
favored, and no one thereafter would molest them.” 48 Meeting forceful
opposition by Indians to a landing in Yucatán, Cortés had the requerimiento
read three times and witnessed by a notary, and the letter to the king reporting
these events was careful to specify that Cortés “did not want war” but that
“the Indians were most resolutely determined to prevent him from landing,
and indeed had already begun to shoot arrows.” 49 This pattern continued, and
the requerimiento was read again the next day to another group of armed
Indians; these Indians, too, according to the official account, were engaged
in betrayal because they were “attacking us with arrows instead of bringing
supplies as they had promised.” 50 The Spanish account emphasizes the need
for self-defense against Indian attackers even before the requerimiento was
read; in this case the Spaniards explained their demands through an
interpreter, asserting that they “did not desire war but only peace and love
between us” – whereupon the Indians “replied not in words but with a shower
of arrows.” 51 The failure to parlay, here and elsewhere, features prominently
in Spanish justifications for violence.
Such accounts of the threat or outbreak of war were often followed
quickly with descriptions of Indians’ ready declarations of their vassalage.
Hernán Cortés records again and again in his letters to the king that Indian
“chieftains” presented gifts and declared themselves “very well pleased to
be Your Highness’s vassals and my friends.” 52 Historians have interpreted
these reports as either willful misreading of Indians’ gestures of liberality
that were intended to signify the opposite – their superiority over Spaniards
and their permission for them to remain – or as part and parcel of selfinterested positioning in order to establish conquistadors’ worthiness for
valuable royal grants and titles. 53 Yet it is doubtful that Cortés was

48. Id. at 12.
49. Id. at 20.
50. Id. at 21.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 54.
53. On the likelihood that the Aztecs’ gifts to Spaniards were signs of dominance rather than
submission, see Inga Clendinnen, Fierce and Unnatural Cruelty: Cortés and the Conquest of Mexico, in
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misreading or misrepresenting so many encounters in the same way. Indians
were familiar with tribute and were also aware of the need to provide it in
the face of superior military power. Like Spaniards accustomed to the chaotic
mixture of full campaigns, staccato raiding, and limited truces of the
Reconquest, Indians suggested by their behavior that they also did not regard
submission as marking a permanent end to warfare or a surrender of
sovereignty. Also, Cortés might have reasonably assumed that his intended
audience at the royal court would not find his accounts of Indians’ pledges
of loyalty either far-fetched or self-aggrandizing because they were the
expected response to a threat of siege or invasion.
Declarations of vassalage, real or imagined, would have in fact
represented to Spaniards standard elements of truce. What truces brought, in
turn, was a powerful rationale for violence in the form of the punishment of
betrayal. Once Indian groups had supposedly declared themselves vassals of
the Spanish king, any resistance to the Spaniards could be styled treachery
and rebellion, and brutally contained. Here again, the Spanish chronicles lay
example on example, including the narrative about the Aztecs’ supposed
betrayal in chasing the Spanish force out of Tenochtitlan. The Aztec ruler’s
act of “treachery” followed several speeches of submission in which
Moctezuma supposedly promised his loyalty to the king and recognized
Cortés’s legitimate right to rule as the king’s representative. The declarations
might have been invented by Cortés. But the betrayal they prefaced hardly
comes as a surprise in the narrative, which presents a string of dodgy acts by
the Aztec ruler clearly intended to undermine and oppose Cortés’s agenda
and that anticipate his violent “rebellion.” Moctezuma’s treachery then
stands as the rationale for every act of vengeance by the Spaniards and their
agents, from the murder of innocents to the burning and destruction of an
entire city. 54
Betrayal was oddly linked, too, to another set of rationales for violence
connected with Spanish imperatives to trade and settle. Historians have noted
the strategic brilliance of Cortés’s founding of the town of Vera Cruz, an act
NEW WORLD ENCOUNTERS 12, 17 (Stephen Greenblatt ed., 1993). For the argument that Cortés
emphasized Indians’ status as vassals in various ways to reinforce his legitimacy as conqueror, see JOSÉ
VALERO SILVA, EL LEGALISMO DE HERNÁN CORTÉS COMO INSTRUMENTO DE SU CONQUISTA 44–47
(1965).
54. Cortés is explicit in connecting the rationale for war to Moctezuma’s “treachery”: “I could
scarcely believe that such a great lord should . . . say that he was my friend, and meanwhile should be
seeking a way to attack me by another’s hand . . . But since it was true that he did not keep his word or
speak the truth, I had changed my plans: whereas, before, I had been going to his land with the intention
of seeing him and speaking with him in order to have him as a friend and to converse with him in harmony,
now I intended to enter his land at war doing all the harm I could as an enemy, though I regretted it very
much, for I had always wished rather to be his friend and ask his advice on all the things that must be
done in this land.” CORTÉS, supra note 47, at 75–76.
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that gave him the possibility of appealing directly to the crown rather than
through his sponsor and enemy, Diego Velásquez, governor of Cuba. From
a legal standpoint, the founding of the town gave Cortés, appointed by the
town council that he himself conjured into existence and that was clearly
acting on his behalf, as the chief justice, with jurisdiction over a vast and
still-unbounded political community of Spanish and Indian subjects. This
jurisdictional power could be called on to authorize specific acts of violence
against Indians as subjects. It is very often difficult to tell when violence was
being justified by jurisdiction or as an element of warmaking. When news
reached Cortés in Tenochtitlan that Indians in a coastal community had
invited a delegation of Spaniards to their town and then killed them, Cortés
insisted that Moctezuma summon the chieftain at the place of the murders
and investigate in order to identify and execute the guilty party. 55 This was
on the surface a judicial act, but Cortés was also compelling Moctezuma to
use his independent authority over subordinate polities.
The same flexible combination of rationales for violence framed the
most spectacular act of Spanish violence of Cortés’s advance on
Tenochtitlan, the massacre at Cholula. When the Spaniards occupied the city,
they negotiated an uneasy truce. In the next days, encouraged by Tlaxcalan
allies who regarded the Cholulans as enemies, the Spaniards scanned the
scene nervously for signs of danger. Whether the inhabitants were planning
to attack or whether Cortés was reading too much into their increasing
reluctance to provide food and placing too much trust in reports from various
quarters about quiet preparations for war, he became convinced that the
Cholulans were planning violence. Cortés ordered all “noblemen, rulers,
captains, chiefs, and also the men of the town” to assemble in the temple
courtyards. 56 Through an interpreter, he chastised them for plotting to harm
the Spaniards and for having agreed to a false truce rather than engaging
enemies in open battle. Ever careful to present a legal rationale for violence,
Cortés declared, according to Bernal Diaz, that “the royal laws” dictated
punishment for their “treasons . . . and that for their crime they must die.” 57
The Spaniards then set upon the Indians trapped in the temple courtyards. In
the Mexica account dictated years later to Fray Bernardino de Sahagun, the
Spaniards’ attack was entirely without legal foundation: “Nothing like this
was in the minds of the Cholulans. Without swords or shields they met the
Spaniards. Without warning, they were treacherously and deceitfully
55. Id. at 89.
56. FRAY BERNARDINO DE SAHAGÚN, FLORENTINE CODEX BOOK 12 29 (1975).
57. BERNAL DÍAZ DEL CASTILLO, THE TRUE HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST OF NEW SPAIN, VOL. II
454 (2010). The fact that the requerimiento was not read became a point of criticism during the residencia
(formal review) of Cortés. CORTÉS, supra note 47, at 454, n. 27.
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slain.” 58 For Cortés, the justification for the massacre activated the theme of
betrayal in a way that bundled arguments about the legitimacy of violence in
self-defense and the authorization to punish vassals who had submitted to
the crown without laying down arms. The same set of rationales created
permission following the massacre for destructive pillaging of the city by the
Tlaxcalans. This posture treated Cholulans simultaneously as enemies and
vassals.
When alliances held, they could have the same effect of preserving
political pluralism. Alliances and the fighting forces they provided were
crucial to the Spanish advance. In joining forces with the Spaniards to defeat
the Aztecs as common enemies, Tlaxcalans assumed the alliance amounted
to a pact of mutual convenience that might transition, once the Aztecs had
been defeated, to a truce between separate polities. Spaniards considered
their indigenous allies to have come under royal authority while retaining
elements of self-rule. 59 These positions did not represent different
understandings of the relationship but instead signified different interests in
how it would develop. 60
In appealing to the Spanish crown for political autonomy, Tlaxcalans
joined in Indian strategies to preserve the autonomy of their political
communities. For the hundreds of small community kingdoms of
Mesoamerica, deference to Spanish demands that they be recognized as
rulers did not necessarily signify surrender, and truces were not always
permanent. The open-endedness of violence meant that Spanish dominance
could only be established through a kind of retail politics combined with
chronic violence. The empire remained, as a result, a patchwork of Spanish
municipalities and republics of Indians, often arrayed in a state of suspended
warfare. The uneven advance of imperial influence through raiding, tentative
jurisdictional acts, and pledged alliances made the empire an interpolity
formation. That structure could also serve to transmit violence. When raiding
ruptured truces or alliances broke down, the webs of protection and alliance
operated, as one historian has observed in the context of North America, like
conduits carrying an electrical charge.61

58.
59.

DE SAHAGÚN,

supra note 56.
R. JOVITA BABER, THE CONSTRUCTION OF EMPIRE: POLITICS, LAW AND COMMUNITY IN
TLAXCALA, NEW SPAIN, 1521–1640 67, 194 (2005).
60. Id. at 134. On the limits to focusing on interpreting “understanding” in such encounters, see
Lauren Benton, In Defense of Ignorance: Frameworks for Legal Politics in the Atlantic World, in JUSTICE
IN BRITISH, IBERIAN, AND INDIGENOUS AMERICA, 1600–1825: THE CHALLENGE OF LEGAL
INTELLIGIBILITY (Brian Owensby & Richard Ross eds., 2018).
61. MICHAEL WITGEN, AN INFINITY OF NATIONS: HOW THE NATIVE NEW WORLD SHAPED EARLY
NORTH AMERICA 293 (2012). See also BRETT RUSHFORTH, BONDS OF ALLIANCE: INDIGENOUS AND
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It remains puzzling that we still have few labels for such interpolity
formations, including little scholarly attention to the vernacular
jurisprudence of the many small wars that made up the bulk of SpanishIndian violent encounters. 62 If the best that contemporaries could do was to
draw in a disorganized and opportunistic way from multiple legal discourses
and political arrangements to create a fluid framework for violence, the
limitation was surely partly intentional since such obfuscations provided
cover for ad hoc violence. The logic of small wars did not reside, that is, in
a well-labeled and coherent political and legal framework. It was transmitted
in the piecemeal descriptions of violence on the margins of war: in the
interstices of truces, the fluctuation of alliances, the legal practices of
settlement, and the subjective definitions of self-defense and betrayal.
CONQUEST AND INTERPOLITY LAW
Empire was a central preoccupation of early modern European jurists. 63
News and commentary about the legal politics of overseas empires filtered
to Europe and influenced debates there, while knowledge of the law,
however flawed, in turn affected the strategies and declarations of imperial
agents. 64 We know that Vitoria, Grotius, and other writers described by
historians as central to the canon of early “international” law were aiming
explicitly to justify or criticize European violence beyond Europe. 65
Commentary on the laws of war was inextricably bound up with assessments
of the legal rights of empires to acquire foreign territory and incorporate new
subjects.
This article has sought to widen the lens through which we examine the
relation between the laws of war and the comportment of imperial agents and
armies. It does so first by placing European practice and discourse about war

ATLANTIC SLAVERIES IN NEW FRANCE (2012). And on the persistence of Indian polities, see generally
Garcia Martinez, supra note 39.
62. See generally Benton & Clulow, supra note 25.
63. Diego Panizza, Alberto Gentili’s De armis Romanis: The Roman Model of the Just Empire, in
THE ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: ALBERICO GENTILI AND THE JUSTICE OF EMPIRE
53, 55 (Benedict Kingsbury & Benjamin Straumann eds., 2010). See generally ANTONY ANGHIE,
IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13–114 (2005); BENTON,
supra note 33, at 1–39, 122–27; PITTS, supra note 9 (forthcoming).
64. See, e.g., Lauren Benton & Benjamin Straumann, Acquiring Empire by Law: From Roman
Doctrine to Early Modern European Practice, 28 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 1–5, 6–7 n.10 (2010); KARUNA
MANTENA, ALIBIS OF EMPIRE: HENRY MAINE AND THE ENDS OF LIBERAL IMPERIALISM (2010); see
generally BENTON & FORD, supra note 9.
65. For especially careful analyses, see DAVID A. LUPHER, ROMANS IN A NEW WORLD: CLASSICAL
MODELS IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY SPANISH AMERICA 73–74 (2003) (examining Vitoria’s position on
Roman imperialism); Annabel Brett, The Space of Politics and the Space of War in Hugo Grotius’s De
iure belli ac pacis, 1 GLOBAL INTEL. HIST. 33, 36–51 (2016) (analyzing Grotius).
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in the context of Eurasian patterns of conquest. That comparative historical
context brings a set of conditions into sharper relief. One is the importance
of political pluralism in structuring campaigns of conquest and its aftermath.
A related finding is the centrality of truces to the conduct of conquest and to
rationales for episodes of extreme violence, often narrated as responses to
the breakdown of friendly relations or alliances. Finally, the compatibility of
truces with raiding emerges as a key feature of interpolity relations along
unstable frontiers of conquest. These elements assembled a useful and
flexible legal framework for violence, one that we can glimpse
independently of the study of theories of just war in the West.
This is not to say that juridical thought was irrelevant to imperial legal
politics. This article’s discussion of violence in the Spanish conquest
illustrates the fluid connections between rationales for attacks on Indians
discussed by European writers and justifications of violence reported by
imperial agents. The requerimiento, written for the Spanish crown, offered a
formula for legitimating attacks on Indians, but interpreting the document
and making sense of its rituals fell to imperial agents who relied on a wider
set of related routines and narratives. Similarly, conquistadors’ emphasis on
Indians’ betrayal as a justification for violence emerged as a response to
perceived dangers, while also supporting strategies to secure royal support
based on suppositions about which legal arguments would find favor at
home.
The flexible legal framework for conquest merged theory and
practice. 66 It resulted not just from iterative connections between them but
also from the similarly varied possibilities of worlds of theory and practice.
The juridical repertoire informing conquerors, in other words, mirrored a
rich and varied grammar of violence and justification in action. In this sense,
campaigns of conquest drew on a playbook rather than stringing together set
66. Andrew Fitzmaurice has argued that the study of legal practices stands apart in my work from
the analysis of the history of legal thought. Fitzmaurice writes that I tend ”to dismiss the work and ideas
of the canonical figures with whom intellectual historians have been concerned.” Andrew Fitzmaurice,
The Dutch Empire in Intellectual History, 132 LOW COUNTRIES HIST. REV. 97, 108 (2017); see also
Andrew Fitzmaurice, Context in the History of International Law, J. HIST. INT’L LAW (forthcoming).
This is a misreading of my work. In A Search for Sovereignty, I call attention to “links between the fluid
politics of empires and the texts of European jurists, including some of the leading figures in the history
of international law: Gentili, Grotius, Bentham, Maine, and others.” BENTON, supra note 33, at xiv, 121,
277–78; explicitly mapping a way to move beyond a mere search for influence between theory and
practice, in Rage for Order, Lisa Ford and I locate “vernacular varieties of political theory” emerging
from “the empire’s legal politics.” BENTON & FORD, supra note 9, at 14. We go on to reject the distinction
between the study of imperial legal politics and the analysis of jurists’ texts: Analyzing imperial legal
politics and “vernacular political theory across the globe . . . works with, not against, intellectual
histories. It redefines intellectual influences as much more diffuse—distributed across the empire in the
writings, utterances, and acts of myriad participants in legal conflicts, all of whom understood their
contests to have wider implications.” Id. at 189.
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pieces: the parlay, the challenge, the pitched battle. The flexibility of
practices of war and peace was more similar to than different from the
ambiguity of laws of war. As Annabel Brett notes with regard to Grotius’s
writings, European juridical approaches to war employed “a multivalent
terminology
that
deliberately
defies
any
overly
reductive
conceptualization.” 67 Strategies and narratives of war by participants also
deployed a multivalent legal logic of conquest that could not be described as
a theory of war. 68
This perspective informs a broader objective, the possibility of
uncovering interpolity law before the rise of international law. 69 As an
example, recent research has examined the importance of “protection talk”
as a widespread category for organizing interpolity relations in the early
modern world. 70 Agreements about protection structured tributary systems
and networks of long-distance trade, while facilitating imperial expansion.
A fluid politics of protection shaped alliances and gave rise to sprawling and
often surprisingly stable interpolity zones. 71 I have argued elsewhere that
“jurisdictional politics” constituted another element of interpolity law
involving jockeying over the ordering of multiple legal authorities. 72
Conflicts over possession and proofs of possession appear to represent
another widely recurring rubric for interpolity relations in the early modern
world. 73
Should conquest feature in this composite image of interpolity law? The
ubiquity of interlocking practices of raiding, invasion, and settlement suggest
they should. As we have seen, the practices spanned Eurasia, Africa, and the
Americas, and warring polities relied on similar expectations about the
possibilities for using, justifying, and fending off violence.
67.
68.
69.

Brett, supra note 65, at 43
Brett, supra note 65, at 42 (describing Grotius’s juridical writings on war).
Lauren Benton & Adam Clulow, Legal Encounters and the Origins of Global Law, in
CAMBRIDGE WORLD HISTORY VOLUME 6: THE CONSTRUCTION OF A GLOBAL WORLD, 1400–1800 CE,
PART 2: PATTERNS OF CHANGE 80, 80–-100 (Jerry Bently et. al. eds., 2015).
70. See BENTON & FORD, supra note 9, at 115–16, 191–92); Lauren Benton & Adam Clulow, The
Long, Strange History of Protection, Introduction to PROTECTION AND EMPIRE: A GLOBAL HISTORY 1,
1–8 (Lauren Benton et. al. eds., 2017).
71. See Benton & Clulow, supra note 70, at 4, 7–8.
72. And blurring, too, the boundary between intra- and interpolity ordering. On jurisdictional
politics, see LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY,
1400–1900 12–15, 80–126 (2002).
73. See Benton & Clulow, supra note 69, at 87–89. Adam Clulow, The Art of Claiming: Possession
and Resistance in Early Modern Asia, 121 THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REV. 17, 17–38 (2016); TAMAR
HERZOG, FRONTIERS OF POSSESSION: SPAIN AND PORTUGAL IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS passim
(2015). This argument has been fleshed out best for Iberian imperial relations. See Lauren Benton,
Possessing Empire: Iberian Claims and Interpolity Law, in NATIVE CLAIMS: INDIGENOUS LAW AGAINST
EMPIRE, 1500–1920 19–40 (Saliha Bellmessous ed., 2011).
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The analysis of these practices brings some surprises, too. If we take
seriously the centrality of truces to the progress of campaigns of conquest,
we might elevate peace-making over invasion as a critical component of
interpolity relations and, paradoxically, of the early modern law of war.
Truces prefigured violence by establishing the basis for presenting conquest
as a serial response to betrayals of trust. The failure to parlay, to make peace,
to submit, and to act the part of loyal vassals—these possibilities were
embedded in the terms of truces, and invaders came prepared to charge their
opponents with such infractions, and to deliver punishment. Cycles of truce
making, tribute extraction, and raiding ruled the rhythm of conquests and
provided their inner logic across legally, religiously, and militarily disparate
settings of a politically fragmented early modern world.

